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Abstract 
  
This paper presents an empirical examination of firm characteristic determinants of 
the capital structure of a sample of 299 Irish small and medium sized firms (SMEs). 
Hypotheses formulated from pecking order and agency theories incorporating a 
financial growth life cycle approach are tested on a number of multivariate regression 
models. Results suggest that age, size, level of intangible activity, ownership structure 
and the provision of collateral are important determinants of the capital structure in 
SMEs. A generalization of Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
approach (SUR) is used to examine industry effects and to test the stability of 
parameter estimates across sectors. Results suggest that the influence of age, size, 
ownership structure and provision of collateral is similar across industry sectors, 
indicating the universal effect of information asymmetries. Firms overcome the lack 
of adequate collateralizable firm assets in two ways; by providing personal assets as 
collateral for business debt, and by employing additional external equity to finance 
research and development projects.   
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1 Introduction 
 
The means of financing employed for positive net present value projects has 
important implications for the firm. The cumulative effect of these discrete financing 
decisions results in the capital structure of the firm, the composition of which has long 
been a focus of research in the corporate finance discipline. Theoretical discourse on 
the capital structure of the firm originates from the irrelevance propositions of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), stating that the capital structure of the firm was 
independent of its cost of capital, and therefore of firm value. The propositions of 
1958 were based on a number of unrealistic assumptions, and in 1963 Modigliani and 
Miller introduced taxes into the model. This led to the development of the trade-off 
theory of capital structure, whereby the tax-related benefits of debt were offset by 
costs of financial distress. Alternative approaches, based on asymmetric information 
between ‘inside’ managers and ‘outside’ investors, include signalling theory (Ross, 
1977) and the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
latter postulates that when internal sources of finance are not sufficient for investment 
needs the firm has a preference to raise external finance in debt markets, with equity 
issues the least preferable source. A further approach considered a nexus of 
relationships, characterised as principal-agent relationships, and the potential agency 
costs on the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
A common refrain in early academic studies on the capital structures of SMEs was 
of a ‘neglected’ and ‘much ignored’ area of research (e.g. Zingales, 2000). The 
burgeoning literature in the field in the past two decades has partially satisfied that 
deficit, although the topic is still in its infancy. The approach commonly adopted in 
previous studies is to test hypotheses formulated from capital structure theories by 
testing static multivariate regression models on panel data (e.g. Michaelas et al., 1999, 
Chittenden et al., 1996, Hall et al., 2004, Sogorb Mira, 2005, Esperanca et al., 2003, 
Fu et al., 2002, Cassar and Holmes, 2003, Heyman et al., 2008). These studies 
investigate the relationship between firm characteristic variables and the means of 
financing chosen, typically employing debt ratios as dependent variables. Studies 
testing multivariate models employing equity as a dependent variable are rare (Ou and 
Haynes, 2006, Fluck et al., 1998), despite the fact that internal equity is the most 
important source of financing for SMEs. Additionally, there is a consistency in the 
independent variables commonly selected. Hall et al., (2000, p.300) note that: “From 
consideration of the previous studies of the determinants of the capital structure of 
small enterprises it becomes clear that profitability, growth, asset structure, size and 
age and possibly industry are, prima facie, likely to be related to capital structure.” 
 
Furthermore, a number of studies examine whether there are inter-industry 
differences in capital structures, due primarily to differences in asset structure and 
growth rates. Empirical evidence of sectoral effects is mixed, with studies both 
supporting (Hall et al., 2000) and failing to support this hypothesis. Examples of the 
latter include Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) who conclude that firm specific 
characteristics are more important than structural characteristics of industry, and 
Jordan et al. (1998) who find that financial and strategy variables have far greater 
explanatory power than industry specific effects.  
 
In this paper we investigate the applicability of theories of capital structure in a 
sample of Irish SMEs by empirically testing the effect of firm characteristics on 
sources of debt and equity employed. Additionally, we examine sectoral differences 
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in the financing decision using a generalisation of Zellner’s (1962) seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) approach. We propose to add to the literature in a number 
of ways. Firstly, whilst previous empirical theory testing studies in SME finance 
tested multivariate regression models on panel data (e.g. Chittenden et al., 1996, Hall 
et al., 2004), we apply regression analysis on survey data, which is novel in finance 
(De Jong and Van Dijk, 2007). Secondly, we employ sources of internal and external 
equity, along with debt as dependent variables in multivariate models. This approach 
differs from previous studies, which typically tested regression models employing 
short- and long-term debt as dependent variables (e.g. Sogorb Mira, 2005). Thirdly, 
we employ detailed data on the provision of collateral by respondents as an 
explanatory variable. Fourthly, we use the SUR approach to test the stability of 
parameter estimates across sectors, differing from the dummy variable approach 
commonly adopted in previous studies (e.g. Chittenden et al., 1996). The advantage of 
the SUR approach is that, whilst the dummy variable approach assumes that the 
response of each sector to each independent variable is identical, the SUR model 
evaluates how independent variables vary as between sectors. Finally, this paper 
contributes to the growing number of country-specific studies on the capital structure 
decision in SMEs by providing original empirical evidence in the Irish context, 
utilising a sample not restricted by sector or location. 
Our results imply that firms source finance in a manner consistent with Myers’ 
(1984) pecking order theory, highlighting the importance of profitability in funding 
the sector. Results indicate that firms with a high level of fixed assets overcome 
problems of asymmetric information by pledging collateral to secure debt finance. 
When there are insufficient firm assets to secure business loans, the personal assets of 
the firm owner are an important source of collateral.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: Firstly, agency and pecking order theories are 
reviewed through a life cycle growth perspective and hypotheses are formulated. The 
sample frame, data collection process and variables are described in section 3. The 
method of analysis is described in section 4, and the empirical results are presented 
and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes, followed by suggestions for further 
research and policy implications in section 7.   
 
 
2 Theoretical review and formulation of hypotheses 
 
Capital structure theories developed since the original Modigliani and Miller 
propositions may be broadly classified in three types; namely static trade-off theory, 
agency theory and theories based on information asymmetries. Whilst these theories 
were developed in the field of corporate finance, they have been profitably employed 
in SME studies. A review of empirical evidence reveals a number of relevant theories 
for our study. 
Introducing taxes into their irrelevance model, Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
highlighted the benefits conferred by debt finance in reducing a firm’s taxation 
liability. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) subsequently proposed the static trade-off 
theory, whereby the advantage conferred by debt in the form of a decreased tax bill 
was offset by an increase in business risk. They proposed a theoretical optimum level 
of debt for a firm, where the present value of tax savings due to further borrowing is 
just offset by increases in the present value of costs of distress. Empirical 
investigations of the trade-off theory in the SME literature do not find evidence to 
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support this theory (Michaelas et al., 1999, Sogorb Mira, 2005). This may be due to 
lower levels of profitability in SMEs, compared with the corporate sector (Pettit and 
Singer, 1985). Firms with lower levels of profitability have less use for debt-tax 
shields, ceteris paribus. Small firms are also at a greater risk of financial distress and 
“young firms are more failure prone than older ones” (Cressy, 2006, p.103). The debt-
tax shield is thus less valuable for SMEs. Furthermore, the Irish corporate tax rate of 
12.5 percent is one of the lowest in the world at present. Because of the combination 
of these factors, we contend that the static trade-off theory is not a first order 
consideration for Irish SMEs. In seeking explanations for the financing decision, we 
must therefore examine alternative theories. Bearing in mind that the capital structure 
of the firm is not static and evolves over time, we incorporate the financial growth life 
cycle approach (Berger and Udell, 1998) in consideration of these theories and 
formulation of hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Hypotheses derived from the pecking order theory 
 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) developed the pecking order theory (POT) 
based on the premise that ‘inside’ management are better informed of the true value of 
the firm than ‘outside’ investors. These information asymmetries result in varying 
costs of additional external finance, as potential investors perceive equity to be riskier 
than debt. They propose that firms seek to overcome problems of undervaluation 
arising from information asymmetries, preferring to finance investment projects with 
internal funds in the first instance. When internal equity is exhausted, firms use debt 
financing before resorting to external equity. Authors state that the POT is even more 
relevant for the SME sector because of the relatively greater information asymmetries 
and the higher cost of external equity for SMEs (Ibbotson et al., 2001). Additionally, a 
common phenomenon in the sector is the desire of firm owners to retain control of the 
firm and maintain managerial independence (Chittenden et al., 1996, Jordan et al., 
1998). These factors suggests that SME owners source their capital from a pecking 
order of, first, their "own" money (personal savings and retained earnings); second, 
short-term borrowings; third, longer term debt; and, least preferred of all, from the 
introduction of new equity investors, which represents the maximum intrusion (Cosh 
and Hughes, 1994). Empirical evidence supports the applicability of the POT in 
explaining the financing of SMEs (Chittenden et al., 1996, Michaelas et al., 1999, 
Berggren et al., 2000, Lopez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias, 2000, Sogorb Mira, 2005, Ou 
and Haynes, 2006). These studies emphasize that small firms rely on internal sources 
of finance and external borrowing to finance operations and growth, and only a very 
small number of firms use external equity. A number of studies report that firms 
operate under a constrained pecking order, and do not even consider raising external 
equity  (Holmes and Kent, 1991, Howorth, 2001). 
Adherence to the POT is dependent not only on demand-side preferences, but also 
on the availability of the preferred source of financing. The supply of finance depends 
on many factors, particularly the stage of development of the firm. The most 
important source of funding for start-up and nascent firms are the personal funds of 
the firm owner, and funding from friends and family (or ‘F-connections’)(Avery et al., 
1998). Thus we propose that: 
H1: The use of personal savings of the SME owner and ‘f connections’ is negatively 
related with age. 
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As the size and age of the firm are inextricably linked, a number of issues are 
correlated. Firstly, start-up and early stage firms are generally smaller than mature and 
older firms, and have a greater proportionate reliance on the personal financial 
resources of the firm owner. Therefore, we propose the hypothesis: 
H2: The use of personal savings of the SME owner and ‘f connections’ is negatively 
related with size. 
 
If the firm is successful as it grows and matures, retained profits are reinvested in 
current and capital projects, augmenting personal sources of funding. A continued 
preference for internal equity increasingly relies on accumulated retained profits as 
the firm survives and matures. Consistent with Myers’ (1984) POT, we propose the 
hypotheses: 
H3: The use of retained profits is positively related with age. 
H4: The use of retained profits is positively related with size. 
 
Start-up and early stage firms may face particular difficulty in sourcing finance for 
investment for a number of reasons. Firstly, internal equity is restricted, as retained 
profits are typically insufficient, and the personal resources of the firm owner and ‘f’ 
connections may be limited. Secondly, a combination of information asymmetries and 
potential agency problems related to the lack of a trading history restricts access to 
external debt, which may be exacerbated by the lack of collateralizable assets. For 
these reasons, start-up and early stage firms may resort to external equity, particularly 
private investors and business angels (Berger and Udell, 1998). SME owners willing 
to cede control may attract funding from venture capitalists, especially firms with 
high-growth potential. Government grant schemes and tax incentive equity schemes 
may also be important sources of external equity financing for fledgling firms, 
especially in strategically targeted sectors (e.g. high-tech). This is especially true in 
the Irish case, as government equity schemes are targeted at nascent firms with high-
potential for exports and employment growth. Thus, we propose the hypothesis: 
H5: The use of external equity is negatively related with age.  
 
Venture capitalists typically invest in firms with high-growth potential, investing 
at a stage when a product or service has been pre-tested. Venture capital investment is 
generally positively correlated with the size of a firm, as a high rate of return is 
required in a relatively short period of three to eight years (Smith and Smith, 2004). 
Firms sourcing additional venture capital funding have typically received previous 
equity funding, and have grown past start-up size. Thus we propose the hypothesis: 
H6: The use of external equity is positively related with size. 
 
Firms with a high demand for additional capital may resort to a greater variety of 
sources of funding than firms with lesser needs. For firms possessing a high-level of 
no-lien fixed assets, debt is the preferred choice to fund positive NPV projects when 
internal funding is insufficient, according to the POT. High growth firms with 
insufficient internal funding and inadequate non-collateralized fixed assets are less 
averse to ceding control, and resort to external equity from new investors (Cressy and 
Olofsson, 1997, Hogan and Hutson, 2005). This may be especially true for firms 
engaged in a high level of intangible activity relative to their turnover (Berggren et al, 
2000). Therefore, we propose that: 
H7: The use of external equity is positively related with intangible activity.  
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Firms engaged in a high level of intangible activity relative to their turnover are 
most likely to report a continuing financial constraint (Westhead and Storey, 1997). 
This is particularly true in the case of young firms of limited turnover, as R&D 
activity generally requires large amounts of capital without providing immediate 
returns on investment (Hall, 2002). Such firms may also have difficulty accessing 
debt markets because of a lack of sufficient collateralizable assets. Thus, we propose 
the hypothesis: 
H8: The use of retained profits is negatively related with intangible activity.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the ownership structure of a firm has a 
significant effect on the desire for control, with consequent implications for financing. 
A number of authors suggest that family controlled firms have a greater desire for 
control and exhibit an aversion to external financing (e.g. Mishra and McConaughy, 
1999). Watson and Wilson (2002, p.575) state “that closely-held firms have both 
greater opportunities and incentives to retain profits in the business”. For closely-held 
firms, we propose that control is the primary determinant in the financing decision:  
H9: The use of internal equity is positively related with closely-held ownership. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses derived from agency theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) outlined a number of potentially costly principal-agent 
relationships in publicly quoted corporations that may arise because the agent does 
not always conduct business in a way that is consistent with the best interest of the 
principals. The firm's security holders (debtholders and stockholders) are seen as 
principals and the firm's management as the agent, managing the principals' assets. 
Whilst a number of these relationships are relevant for SMEs, the primary agency 
conflict in small firms is generally not between owners and managers, but between 
inside and outside contributors of capital (Hand et al., 1982). Potential agency 
problems in SMEs are exacerbated by information asymmetries resulting from the 
lack of uniform, publicly available detailed accounting information. The primary 
concern for outside contributors of capital arises from moral hazard, or the possibility 
of the SME owner changing his behavior to the detriment of the capital provider after 
credit has been granted. This is because the firm owner has an incentive to alter his 
behavior ex post to favor projects with higher returns and greater risk. Debt providers 
seek to minimize agency costs arising from these relationships by employing a 
number of lending techniques. Baas and Schrooten (2006) propose a classification of 
four lending techniques – transactions-based or ‘hard’ techniques include asset-based 
lending, financial statement lending, small business credit scoring lending and the 
‘soft’ technique of relationship lending. In practice, lending to SMEs by banks is 
frequently collateral-based (Kon and Storey, 2003). The pervasiveness of the use of 
collateral is confirmed by a number of empirical studies, for example; Black et al. 
(1996) find that the ratio of loan size to collateral exceeds unity for 85 percent of 
small business loans in the UK; Berger and Udell (1990) report that over 70 percent 
of all loans to SMEs are collateralized. Even for firms with positive cash flow 
financial institutions typically require collateral (Manove et al., 2001). Thus, we 
propose the hypothesis: 
H10: The use of debt finance is positively related with the provision of collateral. 
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Potential agency problems are not constant over the life cycle of the firm. Firms at 
the start-up stage typically experience the greatest informational opacity problems , 
and may not have access to debt financing. As a firm becomes established and 
develops a trading and credit history, reputation effects alleviate the problem of moral 
hazard, facilitating borrowing capacity (Diamond, 1991). Additionally, as the firm 
grows it accumulates assets in the form of inventory, accounts receivable and 
equipment which may be used to collateralize debt (Berger and Udell, 1998). The 
firm may also have increased fixed assets in the form of land and buildings on which 
it can secure mortgage finance. Long term debt is typically secured on collateralizable 
fixed assets, and consequently its maturity matches the maturity of the pledged asset 
(Heyman et al., 2008). Therefore, the use of long term debt is expected to increase 
initially, and decrease at a later stage as long term debt is retired and the firm 
increasingly relies on accumulated retained profits. Our next hypothesis is: 
H11: The use of long term debt is negatively related with age. 
 
Firm size is also an important factor in accessing debt finance (Audretsch and 
Elston, 1997). There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, it may be relatively 
more costly for smaller firms to resolve information asymmetries with debt providers. 
Consequently, smaller firms may be offered less debt capital (Cassar, 2004) or capital 
at a higher cost than larger firms (Baas and Schrooten, 2006). Secondly, transaction 
costs are typically a function of scale and may be higher for smaller firms (Titman & 
Wessels, 1988, Hamilton and Fox, 1998). Thirdly, bankruptcy costs and size are 
inversely related. Cosh and Hughes (1994) propose that this predisposes smaller firms 
to use relatively less debt than larger firms. Therefore, we propose that: 
H12: The use of debt finance is positively related with size. 
 
Financial institutions typically do not advance debt finance to firms engaged in a 
high level of research and development (R&D) in the absence of collateralizable fixed 
assets. R&D expenditure is generally intangible activity, and thus there may be no 
realizable residual value on completion of a project (Storey, 1994). Additionally it 
frequently involves as-yet-unproven technology, and requires specialist and often 
highly-technical knowledge and expertise to conduct a valuation. This proves 
unattractive to debt providers, due to the presence of significant information 
asymmetries. Empirical evidence finds that firms investing large sums of money in 
R&D employ relatively little debt (Bougheas, 2004, Smart et al., 2007). Thus, we 
propose: 
H13: The use of debt finance is negatively related to intangible activity, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Access to tangible assets is not constant across industry sectors. Some sectors (e.g. 
manufacturing) typically have a greater concentration of tangible assets, whilst the 
asset structure of firms in other sectors is primarily composed of intangible assets (e.g. 
computer services). Firms with lien-free tangible assets may have greater access to 
debt finance than firms lacking such assets. The importance of inter- and intra-
sectoral differences in accessing debt finance is confirmed in a number of studies 
reporting a significantly positive relationship between long-term debt and fixed assets 
(Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993, Chittenden et al., 1996, Jordan et al., 1998, 
Michaelas et al., 1999). Therefore, we propose the hypotheses: 
H14: The use of debt finance is positively related with sectors typified by a greater 
amount of tangible fixed assets. 
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There are significant differences between short- and long-term debt contracts, not 
only in the collateral required to secure the debt, but also in the purposes for which 
the finance is required. Short-term debt is generally sourced to cover temporary 
deficits (Esperanca et al., 2003), which lowers the importance of firm or owner 
characteristics. Use of short-term debt is more likely to be determined by levels of 
profitability than the size or age of the firm, for example, although it may be 
dependent on the capacity of the firm to provide suitable collateral. 
    
3 Data collection and variables 
 
The sample frame employed for this study is the Business World ‘Next 1,500’ list of 
firms. This list is compiled from a number of sources, including the companies 
registration office (CRO), print and internet media sources, and the National 
Directory Database (NDD), and is maintained and updated annually. These firms are 
classified as having at least 20 employees. The list was substantially refined and 
modified to obtain a list of firms consistent with the aims of the study and within the 
parameters the European Commission (2003) definition of an SME, with an upper 
bound of 250 employees. Approximately one third of the firms were subsidiaries of 
multinational parents, and these firms were excluded from the study. Financial firms 
were also left out, as their capital structure may be determined by capital requirements. 
Because of the lower bound of 20 employees, micro enterprises and small firms with 
between 10 and 20 employees are not represented in the listing. An advantage of this 
sampling frame is that it is not confined to particular sectors or geographical regions, 
although it is not representative of the total Irish SME population in the strictest 
sense, because it contains predominantly ‘medium sized’ surviving firms. Distributing 
questionnaire surveys using a multimode approach yielded 299 responses from a 
sample of 702 eligible firms, representing a response rate of 42.6 percent. This is a 
robust response rate when compared with response rates of 10 percent and less 
reported in previous surveys (Curran and Blackburn, 2001). We attribute this high rate 
to a number of elements in the research design, including multiple contacts, the 
salience of the subject for respondents and cognitive and design elements of the 
survey instrument. A detailed profile of the age, turnover and sectoral composition of 
respondents is provided in table 1. 
 
Insert table 1 approximately here. 
 
3.1 Specification of dependent and independent variables 
 
SME owner-manager’s personal income is interrelated with the income of the 
firm, and so they are reluctant to disclose detailed financial information about their 
business (Ang, 1991, Avery et al., 1998). In conducting the National Survey on Small 
Business Finances (NSSBF) in the United States, researchers reported difficulties in 
eliciting data on firm financing, particularly absolute amounts (Cox et al, 1989). 
Additionally, there were often inaccuracies in the amounts reported (Cox et al, 1989). 
We requested data on financing as a percentage of total financing rather than absolute 
amounts due to the well-documented reticence of SME owners in disclosing this data. 
Although percentages reported may be slightly inaccurate, the methodology used 
greatly increased response rates as 92.5 percent of respondents provided useable 
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replies to this question. The dependent variables used in this study are the sources of 
finance expressed as a percentage of total financing. 
 
Insert table 2 approximately here. 
 
Means and standard deviations of dependent variables across sectors are provided 
in table 3, indicating statistically significant differences in cross-sectional capital 
structures. Results suggest prima facie evidence for sectoral differences in financing 
choice, denoted by statistically significant differences in the use of retained profits, 
long term debt and external equity. The Anova does not account for differences in 
characteristics such as firm age, size and ownership structure as between sectors. Inter 
industry differences are examined using an SUR approach, and results are discussed 
in section 5. 
 
Insert table 3 approximately here. 
 
The independent or firm characteristic variables are chosen to test the hypotheses 
formulated in the previous section, and are described in table 4 below. A number of 
independent variables are directly observable, such as the age and size of the firm, and 
the assets pledged to secure business loans. Other variables are defined by proxy. 
Expenditure on R&D as a determinant of financing choice has been examined in 
previous research as a proxy for future growth opportunities (Long and Malitz, 1985, 
Titman and Wessels, 1988, Michaelas et al., 1999). We examine relative expenditure 
on R&D as a measure of the intangible activity of respondents, rather than an 
intangible asset or a growth opportunity, as intangible activity only manifests itself as 
a growth opportunity if successful. The ownership variable is defined as a 
dichotomous dummy variable, representing closely held or family ownership of the 
firm.   
 
Insert table 4 approximately here. 
 
Correlation among independent variables may pose problems in interpreting 
regression coefficients. This is not a problem of model specification, but of data (Hair 
et al., 2006). Pearson product moment coefficients presented in table 5 indicate the 
magnitude and direction of the association between the independent variables. A 
number of independent variables are correlated at the 0.01 level of significance, and 
in these instances we reject the null hypothesis that there is no association between the 
variables. The moderate magnitude of the correlations does not suggest a high degree 
of first-order collinearity among the independent variables. 
 
Insert table 5 approximately here. 
 
Although the magnitude of correlation coefficients is moderate, a lack of high 
correlation values does not ensure absence of collinearity, as the combined effect of 
two or more independent variables may cause multicollinearity. The conventional 
measures for multicollinearity are tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
The tolerance value is the amount of an independent variable’s predictive ability that 
is not predicted by the other independent variables in the equation (Hair et al, 2006). 
A tolerance value of 1.00 indicates that a variable is totally unaffected by other 
independent variables. Analysis of the tolerance values and VIFs in table 6 indicates 
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that multicollinearity does not pose a problem. The hypothesized relationship between 
variables is presented in table 7 as a comparison with the direction of the regression 
coefficients. 
 
4 Method of analysis 
 
The hypotheses formulated in section 2 were empirically tested using static linear 
regression models, employing sources of finance and firm characteristics as 
dependent and independent variables respectively. The model tested for each of the 
six dependent variables is represented by: 
 
Y = β0 + β1AGE + β2SIZE + β3R&D + β4OWN + β7OWNCOLL+ β8EXTCOLL + ε 
 
 
We ran cross-sectional OLS-regressions using data provided by all respondents, 
initially ignoring differences in asset structure and other sectoral factors. We 
investigate the influence of sectoral effects on the financing decision by estimating a 
set of regression equations, one for each industry sector, and examining how the 
observed relationships change from equation to equation. Thus, for each of the six 
independent variables six additional parameter coefficients per industry are estimated. 
This seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system, developed by Zellner (1962), 
comprises several individual relationships that are linked by contemporaneous cross-
equation error correlation. Because the errors of the equations are correlated, the SUR 
estimator is more efficient, as it takes account of the matrix of correlations of all 
equations (Baltagi, 2005).  
Previous studies have employed a variety of approaches to examine industry 
effects, including; a one-way analysis of variance (Esperanca et al., 2003), using 
industry dummies (Michaelas et al., 1999) and employing both industry constant and 
industry slope dummies (Hall et al., 2000). The dummy approach commonly used 
calculates an intercept dummy, suggesting that the sectoral impact is unrelated to the 
independent variables. We contend, however, that response to the independent 
variables varies as between sectors. Testing these effects using the OLS dummy 
approach would require estimating slope and intercept dummies for every variable, 
thus adding another 30 variables to the right hand side of the regression model. This 
in itself would reduce the efficiency of the OLS estimates. Whilst this approach has 
been adopted in previous studies (e.g. Hall et al., 2004), it would greatly reduce the 
degrees of freedom in our models and weaken the generalizability of the regression 
results. Maximizing the degrees of freedom improves generalizability and addresses 
both model parsimony and sample size concerns (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
5 Empirical results 
 
Results of the OLS regression analyses are statistically significant for all six 
dependent variables, and are presented in table 6. The statistically significant negative 
relationship between size of the firm and use of the personal funds of the firm owner 
and ‘f’ connections reflects the importance of personal resources of the firm owner in 
funding firms with low turnover. This source of finance is typically of greatest 
importance in younger firms, although we reject the hypothesized negative 
relationship between it and age of the firm as it is not statistically significant. These 
results suggest that contribution of firm owners’ personal equity is important not only 
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at start-up, but throughout the life-cycle of the firm, particularly in the smallest firms. 
Use of personal assets of the firm owner to secure business debt is positively related 
with use of funds from personal sources and ‘f’ connections. This finding suggests 
that firm owners willing to supply personal funds as equity for investment are also 
most likely to supply ‘quasi-equity’ to the firm. This result provides empirical 
evidence of the personal commitment of small business owners in securing business 
loans outlined by (Black et al., 1996, Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006, Cressy, 1993, 
Avery et al., 1998), and explains the provision of debt finance to start-up and nascent 
firms (Fluck et al., 1998, Berger and Udell, 1998). This finding also underlines the 
significant personal risk assumed by owners of SMEs, and emphasises a contribution 
that is commonly understated as it is not immediately evident from balance sheet 
figures. 
 
Insert table 6 approximately here. 
 
Relationships between firm characteristic variables and use of retained profits 
provide support for a number of the propositions of pecking order and agency 
theories. Statistically significant positive relationships between retained profits and 
the firm age and size variables support hypotheses three and four, highlighting the 
reliance of firms on accumulated internal equity over time. Additionally, the use of 
retained profits is significantly negatively related with both types of collateral, 
suggesting that debt is employed when internal equity is insufficient for investment 
needs. Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Sogorb Mira, 2005, Heyman 
et al., 2008), this result highlights the importance of  profitability in funding the 
sector.  
Expenditure on R&D is significantly negatively related to use of retained profits, 
and positively related to use of external equity. This finding supports Bougheas' (2004) 
view that liquidity constraints due to inadequate retained profits necessitates 
additional resources for investment in R&D. The result provides evidence that SMEs 
committing a large percentage of turnover to expenditure on R&D may be restricted 
in their access to financing due to the nature of their assets (Bester, 1985) and their 
activities. Additionally, the positive relationship between use of external equity and 
expenditure on R&D is consistent with studies indicating that firms with a higher 
level of investment in innovation are less averse to ceding control (Berggren et al., 
2000, Hogan and Hutson, 2005). An important qualification in this respect is the 
ownership structure of the firm, as the significant negative relationship between 
ownership and use of external equity indicates a greater desire for control among 
closely held firms (Poutziouris, 2003, Watson and Wilson, 2002, Poutziouris et al., 
1998). This result is unsurprising, although it provides further evidence of how the 
desire to maintain managerial independence and retain control of the firm impacts the 
financing decision, even if this means passing up growth opportunities (Storey, 1994, 
Poutziouris, 2001). 
The statistically significant positive relationship between use of long term debt 
and size of the firm supports the hypothesis that size is positively related to use of 
long term debt, and is consistent with extant empirical evidence (Michaelas et al., 
1999, Sogorb Mira, 2005). The significant negative relationship between use of long 
term debt and age of the firm indicates that firms become increasingly reliant on 
internal equity as debt is retired. This result provides further evidence of the 
importance of profitability in funding the sector, and suggests that firms are funded in 
a manner consistent with the POT. Importance of access to lien-free collateralisable 
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assets in securing debt finance is emphasized by the statistically significant positive 
relationship between the provision of collateral secured on the assets of the firm and 
short and long term debt. These results provide empirical evidence of the proclivity of 
financial institutions to use asset based lending techniques in seeking to overcome 
potential problems of moral hazard (Coco, 2000). They are also consistent with the 
previous finding that debt financing is strongly related to collateral, rather than 
profitability as might be expected in an efficient market (Chittenden et al., 1996). 
Personal commitment of the firm owner is emphasized by the statistically significant 
positive relationship between provision of the firm owner’s personal assets as 
collateral to secure short-term debt. This confirms previous empirical findings (Binks 
et al., 1988, Cressy, 1993), and suggests that firm owners provide personal assets as 
collateral for short-term rather than long-term debt.  
Whilst the explanatory power of our model employing short-term debt as a 
dependent variable is low, it highlights the temporary nature of this source of finance. 
Esperanca et al., (2003) explain the lack of statistical significance for short term debt 
as being due to the temporary nature of deficits covered by short-term debt, lowering 
the importance of purely fiscal or firm characteristic considerations. A comparison of 
the direction in both hypothesised and actual relationships between dependent and 
independent variables is presented in table 7.  
 
Insert table 7 approximately here. 
 
 
The regression results presented in table 6 indicate the relationships between firm 
characteristics and sources of financing for all respondents. Results of the SUR 
models presented in tables 8 to 13 indicate differences in the stability and variability 
of regression coefficients across sectors. One contribution of the SUR model is that 
the standard errors of the estimates are reduced, and it is therefore a more efficient 
estimator of coefficients. Comparison of t statistics of coefficients in table 6 with 
those in tables 8 to 13 reveals evidence of slightly increased efficiency.  
 
Insert tables 8 to 13 approximately here. 
 
Extant empirical evidence of sectoral effects on the capital structures of SMEs is 
contradictory. Whilst results presented by Michaelas et al. (1999) support this 
hypothesis, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) state that firm specific characteristics are 
more important than sectoral effects. Results from our SUR models suggest support 
both positions. Firstly, the influence of a number of firm characteristic independent 
variables is similar across sectors. Results from the OLS regression indicate a 
negative relationship between firm size and the use of personal funds of the firm 
owner and ‘f’ connections, as this source forms a greater percentage of investment 
finance in firms with low turnover, ceteris paribus. SUR results presented in table 8 
show that this negative relationship is replicated in models for all but one sector, and 
is statistically significant for ‘all respondents’, the ‘metal manufacturing and 
engineering’ and ‘other manufacturing’ sectors. This is not an unexpected result as the 
large amounts of investment capital required by manufacturing sectors are not 
typically sourced from personal resources. Another relationship for the model 
including all respondents replicated in three sectors is the positive relationship 
between the personal sources of equity of the firm owner with the pledging of 
personal assets as collateral for business loans. This relationship is positive for all 
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sectors, and is statistically significant in respect of the ‘hotel, catering, retail and 
distribution’, ‘other services’ and ‘other’ sectors. These results emphasize a central 
feature of SME financing – the contribution of personal resources by the firm owner, 
although sectoral differences are not apparent. 
Results for SUR models employing retained profits as a dependent variable 
suggest that the influence of firm characteristics is similar across a number of 
sectors.The statistically significant positive relationship between the use of retained 
profits and size is repeated in respect of the ‘manufacturing’ and ‘hotel, catering, 
wholesale and retail’ sectors, possibly reflecting the relatively larger turnover in these 
sectors. The negative relationship between use of retained profits and the provision of 
collateral to secure debt is statistically significant for models including all 
respondents, the ‘hotel, catering, retail and distribution’, ‘other services’ and ‘other’ 
sectors. These results suggest similarities in adherence to Myer’s (1984) pecking 
order of finance across sectors. One of the explanations offered for the adherence of 
SMEs to the POT is the desire of firm owners to retain control of the firm and 
maintain independence, particularly in closely held firms. This explanation is 
supported by the significant positive relationship between the use of retained profits 
and closely held firms for the models including all respondents, the ‘metal 
manufacturing and engineering’ and ‘other’ sectors presented in table 9. Results also 
indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between use of external equity 
and closely held ownership in models containing all respondents, the ‘metal 
manufacturing and engineering, ‘hotel, catering, retail and distribution’ and ‘other’ 
sectors presented in table 10. These results suggest that the issue of control is 
determined by ownership structure, rather than differing across sectors. 
Results of the OLS regression models presented in table 6 highlight the 
importance of collateral in sourcing short-and long-term debt. Results of the SUR 
models presented in table 13 reveal statistically significant positive relationships 
between use of total debt and the assets of the firm provided as collateral for all 
models, except the ‘other’ sector. Results also indicate statistically significant positive 
relationships between short term debt and firm assets provided as collateral for all 
sectors except ‘other services’ and ‘other’ sectors. These results are not replicated for 
long term debt, however, and so we reject hypotheses 10 and 14. 
 Results presented in tables 11 and 13 reveal a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the pledging of personal assets to secure business loans and the 
use of short term debt and total debt respectively for firms in the ‘computer software 
development and services’ sector. Consistent with previous studies (Fluck et al., 1998, 
Berger and Udell, 1998), this result suggests that firms in the sector secure firm debt 
using personal assets due to the lack of adequate tangible firm assets. The statistically 
significant negative relationship between the use of external equity and the provision 
of firm assets to secure firm debt for firms in this sector implies further support for 
this proposal. These results are consistent with agency theory, and provide evidence 
of the reliance of financial institutions on asset-based lending techniques to overcome 
potential moral hazard problems. 
Additionally, these results are consistent with the High-Technology Pecking Order 
Hypothesis (HTPOH) which proposes that high-technology firms requiring additional 
finance will seek external equity before debt (Hogan and Hutson, 2005). Whilst 
results from our study suggest that respondents in the ‘computer software 
development and services’ sector provide personal and firm assets to secure debt 
finance, the statistically significant positive relationship between the use of external 
equity and size for firms in this sector shown in table 10 indicates that larger firms use 
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greater amounts of external equity, ceteris paribus. This suggests that smaller firms in 
this sector may have difficulty in securing external equity, thus employing debt 
finance. Lack of tangible firm assets to secure this funding means that firm owners 
must provide personal assets on which to secure firm debt. 
Another significant feature of debt and equity markets for SMEs is highlighted by 
the relationship between the use of debt and expenditure on R&D. The relationship 
between the use of short term debt and total debt and expenditure on R&D is positive 
for firms in the ‘other manufacturing’ sector, and negative for firms in the ‘computer 
software development and services’ sector. This suggests that firms in a sector 
typified by high levels of tangible assets (‘other manufacturing’) fund R&D with debt, 
whereas firms in a sector typified by high levels of intangible assets (‘computer 
software development and services’) fund R&D with external equity. Whilst results of 
the SUR models indicate the common influence of firm characteristics across sectors, 
as well as sectoral differences in sourcing finance, we are cautious in our 
interpretations and conclusions due to low levels of statistical significance. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This study empirically tested hypotheses formulated from theories of capital structure 
by investigating the influence of a number of firm characteristic determinants on SME 
financing. Results from multivariate models tested on survey data support a number 
of the propositions of agency and pecking order theories, confirming a number of 
findings of previous studies, albeit with a smaller sample. The results of the study 
emphasize (1) The increased use of internal equity as the firm develops over time, (2) 
the importance of the provision of collateral in alleviating information asymmetries 
and securing debt finance, and (3) the significant contribution of the firm owner 
through the contribution of equity and pledging personal assets as collateral for 
business loans. 
The positive relationship between the use of retained profits and the age and size 
of the firm indicates that surviving firms are increasingly reliant on internal equity as 
accumulated profits are reinvested. This suggests a tendency to use capital which 
minimizes intrusion into the business, and is consistent with the POT. Another 
important source of internal equity is the personal funds of the firm owner, and funds 
of friends and family which are most important in firms with low turnover. 
Furthermore, results indicate that the firm owner contributes ‘quasi-equity’ in the 
form of the provision of personal assets as collateral for firm loans. These 
contributions emphasize the importance of the personal wealth of the firm owner in 
SME financing (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), and indicate the significance of the risk 
taking propensity of the firm owner in the financing decision.    
Results indicate that the use of long term debt financing is positively related with 
the size of the firm, and negatively related with firm age. The latter result suggests 
maturity matching, and indicates that firms increasingly use retained profits for 
investment projects as debt is retired over time. It is also indicative of the importance 
of the provision of fixed assets as collateral to secure debt finance. Results indicate 
that SMEs with a high level of fixed assets overcome problems of asymmetric 
information by pledging collateral to secure debt finance, as financial institutions seek 
to reduce agency costs of debt financing using asset-based lending techniques.  In 
cases where there are insufficient lien-free firm assets to secure business loans, the 
personal assets of the firm owner are an important source of collateral. Debt secured 
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on the personal assets of the firm owner is most prevalent among firms with low 
turnover, and among owners who also invest personal funds, and funds of friends and 
family in the firm.  
Firms with a higher expenditure on R&D use higher levels of external equity and 
lower levels of internal equity. This result suggests that high growth firms typically 
do not have sufficient internal finance to meet their investment needs, and confirms 
the finding of (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997) that owners of firms seeking to grow are 
less averse to ceding control than those not seeking growth. Ownership structure is 
also negatively related to external equity and positively related to internal equity, 
confirming the well documented desire for independence and control of closely held 
firms (Watson & Wilson, 2002).  
Analysis of the variation in the direction and magnitude of regression coefficients 
across sectors provides tentative evidence of the similarity of the influence of firm 
characteristics across sectors. Although a general lack of statistical significance 
precludes generalization of these findings, they indicate that a number of salient 
issues are relevant in sourcing investment finance for all SMEs, irrespective of sector. 
The common underlying factor in accessing external finance is the alleviation of 
information asymmetries, which is relatively easier for firms with a high level of fixed 
assets accessing debt markets, ceteris paribus. Firms engaged in a high level of 
intangible activity, with low turnover and a low level of tangible assets have a greater 
reliance on external equity. Thus, although the problems of information asymmetries 
may be universal, access to debt and equity markets is highly influenced by access to 
lien-free collateralizable assets and the investment preferences of investors. 
 
7 Policy and research implications 
 
Policy considerations emanating from our study are centered on the provision of the 
most important sources of finance for SMEs, namely retained profits and debt finance. 
Previous studies proposed that fiscal policies should incentivize reinvestment of 
earnings by providing tax incentives for a percentage of profits retained in the firm 
(Chittenden et al., 1998, Michaelas et al., 1999). The potential reduction in the 
taxation burden of SMEs under this proposal is of greater benefit in countries with 
high rates of corporate tax. The effectiveness of such a policy in Ireland is reduced 
because of the relatively low corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent. Possibly of more 
relevance is the disproportionate level of incentives for diverse investment options. 
Recent criticism publicised the greater concentration of resources in providing tax 
incentives for property investment compared with a lack of similar incentives for 
investing in the small business sector. A reconsideration of public policy to provide 
greater incentives for investing in SMEs would provide a ‘more level playing field’ 
for investment, and would raise levels of productive capital. Similarly, SME owners 
currently have a greater tax incentive to extract retained earnings from the firm and 
invest in a personal pension plan than to reinvest these funds in the firm. Public policy 
aimed at developing and expanding the capacity of the SME sector should consider 
making it more attractive for SME owners to reinvest retained profits than to extract 
them from the firm. 
An interesting finding of our study is the positive relationship between the use of 
the firm owner’s personal funds and funds from ‘f’ connections and the provision of 
the personal assets of the firm owner as collateral to secure business debt. This 
heightened risk assumed by a number of business owners is likely to increase, as a 
number of authors (e.g. Tanaka, 2003) have indicated that smaller, riskier firms may 
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have greater difficulty sourcing debt finance because of the more stringent capital 
adequacy requirements for banks under the Basel II proposals. This may result in an 
even wider occurrence of the practice of providing personal assets to secure business 
debt (including the family home), as firm owners attempt to secure funds for 
investment. This practice negates the limited liability status of incorporated firms and 
can cause considerable personal loss and distress to the firm owner and his family. 
Public policy initiatives should be designed to safeguard the home of the SME owner, 
and reduce the adverse social effects in the event of default on a business loan. It is 
important, however, in consideration of such a policy not to advance loans in excess 
of socially unproductive levels (De Meza and Webb, 2000). Additionally, financial 
institutions should consider reducing their dependency on asset-based lending 
technologies, concentrating instead on techniques such as financial statement lending. 
This, in turn, would reduce information asymmetries by obliging SMEs to provide 
detailed financial accounting information conforming with internationally accepted 
accounting principles. 
Further research could test the issues raised in this study across a large 
representative sample of SMEs. It would be particularly beneficial to expand this 
study using surveys or in-depth interviews. This research method enables collection of 
detailed additional information on the process of raising finance and how this is 
influenced by factors such as past experience with financiers, the pledging of personal 
guarantees to secure debt finance, the percentage of the firm owner’s wealth invested 
in the firm, issues of succession and a myriad of other factors. Integration of these 
contextual and explanatory factors into our model would provide a more holistic view 
of the financing decision. It would also allow a more in-depth examination of how the 
incremental financing decision of the SME owner changes through successive 
developmental stages of the firm. In light of the dependence of some firms on the 
personal sources of equity of the firm owner, along with the provision of personal 
assets as collateral to secure business loans, further studies may also benefit from 
integrating a personal risk measure for SME owners into the model. 
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 Table 1. Age, industry and turnover profile of respondents 
 
 
 
Table 2. Description of dependent variables 
Dependent Variable  Description of Variable 
Personal Savings and ‘f’ 
connections (PERF) 
 Personal savings of founder(s), funds from friends and Family (as 
a percentage of total financing) 
Retained Profits (RET∏)  Retained Profits (as a percentage of total financing) 
External Equity (EXTEQ)  Venture Capital + Business Angels and Private Investors+ 
Government Grants and Equity (as a percentage of total financing) 
Long-term Debt (LTD)  Long term debt (as a percentage of total financing) 
Short-term Debt (STD)  Short term bank loans and overdraft (as a percentage of total 
financing) 
 
 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of dependent variables across sectors 
Industry Personal 
savings of 
founder(s), 
funds from 
friends & 
family 
 Retained 
Profits 
 Short 
term bank 
loans & 
overdraft 
Long term 
debt 
instruments  
External 
Equity 
Metal manufacturing 
and Engineering .148 (.27) 
 .498 (.41)  .135 (.26) .028 (.09) .075 (.17) 
Other manufacturing .070 (.17)  .395 (.36)  .205 (.25) .116 (.23) .054 (.16) 
Computer software 
development/services .095 (.20) 
 .176 (.33)  .194 (.35) .028 (.10) .327 (.41) 
Distribution, Retail, 
Hotels & Catering .075 (.22) 
 .324 (.39)  .232 (.33) .093 (.25) .054 (.19) 
Other services .104 (.26)  .393 (.41)  .194 (.33) .097 (.21) .012 (.05) 
Other .126 (.24)  .350 (.45)  .120 (.23) .047 (.13) .212 (.36) 
Total .096 (.22)  .349 (.39)  .191 (.30) .073 (.19) .115 (.27) 
One way Anova F 
statistic .905 
 3.77*  .955 2.019** 11.476* 
**,* Statistically significant at the 99% and 95% levels of confidence respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A.   Panel B.   Panel C.  
Age of 
Firm 
 
Proportion 
of 
Sample (%) 
 Industry Type Proportion 
of 
Sample 
(%) 
 Turnover 
 
Proportion 
of 
Sample (%) 
< 5 years 5.1  Metal manufacturing 
and Engineering 
15.6  <€1m 3.1 
5-9 years 17.2  Other manufacturing 21.3  €1m-€2.99m 11.6 
10-14 years 12.8  Computer software 
development/services 
17.3  €3m-€4.99m 13.3 
15-19 years 10.4  Distribution, Retail, 
Hotels & Catering 
27.5  €5m-€9.99m 31.6 
20-29 years 21.5  Other services 9.1  €10m-€20m 32.0 
>30 years 33  Other 9.2  €20m-€50m 8.5 
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Table 4. Description of independent variables 
Independent Variable  Description of Variable 
AGE  Age of the firm in years at the time of the survey (categorical 
variable) 
SIZE  Gross Sales turnover of the firm (categorical variable) 
R&D  Percentage of turnover spent on Research and Development 
(categorical variable) 
OWN  Closely held ownership of firm (Dichotomous dummy variable) 
Internal Collateral 
(INTCOLL) 
 Percentage of debt secured by liens on the fixed assets of the firm. 
Owner’s Collateral 
(OWNCOLL) 
 Percentage of debt secured by personal assets of firm owner 
 
 
Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients.  
*Correlation is statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence (2-tailed) 
 
 
Table 6. Estimated ordinary least squares regression coefficients. 
 Internal Equity External Equity 
Debt Collinearity  
Statistics 
 PERF RET∏ EXTEQ STD LTD Tolerance VIF 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
   
AGE -.002 (-.204) 
.030** 
(2.01) 
-.008 
(-.806) 
.008 
(.667) 
-.015* 
(-1.90) .724 1.38 
SIZE -.031* (-2.92)  
.035* 
(1.80) 
.010 
(.745) 
.009 
(.583) 
.016* 
(1.63) .805 1.24 
R&D .007 (.404) 
-.098*** 
(-3.22) 
.113*** 
(5.83) 
-.011 
(-.458) 
-.001 
(-.086) .760 1.31 
OWN .028 (1.04) 
.078 
(1.60) 
-.158*** 
(-5.05) 
-.005 
(-.115) 
-.011 
(-.427) .827 1.21 
OWNCOLL .260* (5.59) 
-.238*** 
(-2.86) 
-.044 
(-.823) 
.129* 
(1.89) 
.014 
(.330) .919 1.09 
INTCOLL -.033 (-1.18) 
-.135*** 
(-2.71) 
-.040 
(-1.27) 
.147*** 
(3.60) 
.110*** 
(4.19) .882 1.13 
Constant .186* (2.53) 
.293** 
(2.23) 
.022 
(.265) 
.074 
(.684) 
.033 
(.480)   
Adjusted R2 16.2 14.9 25.9 4.5 6.5   
“F” Value 10.168 9.28 17.573 3.218 4.3   
Significance of 
“F” .000 .000 .000 .005 .000   
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  AGE SIZE R&D OWN INTCOLL 
AGE       
SIZE  .269*     
R&D  -.381* -.377*    
OWN  .378* .078 -.256*   
INTCOLL  .194* .232* -.211* .069  
EXTCOLL  -.157* -.159 .059 .032 -.219* 
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Table 7. Summary of the relationships between variables 
 PERF RET∏ EXTEQ STD LTD 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
AGE - / (-) + / (+) - / (-) + / (-) - / (-) 
SIZE - / (-) + / (+) + / (+) + / (+) + / (+) 
R&D + / (+) - / (-) + / (+) - / (+/-) - / (-) 
OWN + / (+) + / (+) - / (-) - / (-) - / (-) 
OWNCOLL + / (+) - / (-) - / (-) + / (+) + / (+) 
INTCOLL - / (-) - / (-) - / (-) + / (+) + / (+) 
Hypothesized relationships in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 8. Regression coefficients of seemingly unrelated regression models employing ‘personal 
savings & ‘f’ connections’ as the dependent variable. 
 ALL METAL MANU COMPU HOTEL SERVS OTHER 
AGE -.002 
(-.207) 
.018 
(.531) 
-.006 
(-.448) 
.005 
(.178) 
-.011 
(-.744) 
-.010 
(-.375)  
.000 
(-.010) 
SIZE -.031*** 
(-2.96) 
-.089** 
(-2.52) 
-.063*** 
(-3.25) 
-.016 
(-.627) 
-.008 
(-.368) 
-.032 
(-.868) 
.023 
(1.02) 
R&D .007 
(.409) 
.031 
(.452) 
.018 
(.533) 
-.009 
(-.292) 
.081** 
(2.07) 
.044 
(.558)  
.038 
(1.09) 
OWN .028 
(1.06) 
.031 
(.309) 
-.023 
(-.459) 
-.042 
(-.612) 
-.021 
(-.408) 
.137 
(1.66) 
.068 
(1.57)  
OWNCOLL .260*** 
(5.66) 
.123 
(.697) 
.148 
(1.54) 
.155 
(1.45) 
.344*** 
(5.17) 
.597*** 
(2.94) 
.560*** 
(5.22) 
INTCOLL -.033 
(-1.20) 
-.126 
(-1.46) 
.008 
(.161) 
-.040 
(-.529) 
.017 
(.325) 
-.025 
(-.283) 
-.035 
(-.721) 
Constant .186** 
(2.56) 
.370 
(1.58) 
.331** 
(2.53) 
.159 
(.930) 
-.003 
(-.023) 
.094 
(.433) 
-.140 
(-.834)  
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively 
 
 
Table 9. Regression coefficients of seemingly unrelated regression models employing ‘retained profits’ 
as the dependent variable. 
 ALL METAL MANU COMPU HOTEL SERVS OTHER 
AGE .030** 
(2.04) 
-.039 
(-.782) 
.023 
(.858)  
.034 
(.837) 
.030 
(.998) 
.035 
(.769) 
.000 
(.004) 
SIZE .035* 
(1.82) 
.076 
(1.44) 
.098** 
(2.35)  
-.009 
(-.223) 
.069* 
(1.71) 
.031 
(.499) 
-.058 
(-.781)  
R&D -.098*** 
(-3.26) 
-.148 
(-1.44) 
-.111 
(-1.50) 
-.053 
(-1.09) 
-.126* 
(-1.65)  
-.256* 
(-1.87) 
-.333*** 
(-3.00) 
OWN .078* 
(1.62) 
.266* 
(1.81) 
.108 
(1.00) 
.032 
(.299) 
.116 
(1.14) 
.036 
(.252) 
.290** 
(2.09) 
OWNCOLL -.238*** 
(-2.89) 
-.208 
(-.795) 
.097 
(.475) 
-.220 
(-1.32) 
-.330*** 
(-2.55) 
-.325 
(-.929) 
-.203 
(-.590) 
INTCOLL -.135*** 
(-2.74) 
.006 
(.047) 
-.118 
(-1.17) 
.071 
(.611) 
-.288*** 
(-2.90) 
  -.267* 
(-1.76) 
-.381** 
(-2.43) 
Constant .293** 
(2.26) 
.469 
(1.35)  
.064 
(.229) 
.251 
(.941) 
.180 
(.677) 
.598 
(1.59) 
1.52*** 
(2.83)  
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively 
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Table 10. Regression coefficients of seemingly unrelated regression models employing ‘external 
equity’ as the dependent variable. 
 ALL METAL MANU COMPU HOTEL SERVS OTHER 
AGE -.008 
(-.816)  
-0.017 
(-.859) 
0.004 
(.288)  
0.005 
(.123) 
-0.013 
(-.871) 
0.004 
(.594) 
0.032 
(.831) 
SIZE .010 
(.754) 
-0.008 
(-.374) 
-0.001 
(-.070) 
0.082** 
(2.10) 
0.019 
(.919) 
-0.005 
(-.618) 
0.056 
(1.03) 
R&D .113*** 
(5.90) 
0.062 
(1.54) 
-0.044 
(-1.27) 
0.203*** 
(4.20) 
-0.001 
(-.014) 
-0.015 
(-.792) 
0.148** 
(2.32)  
OWN -.158*** 
(-5.12)  
-0.127** 
(-2.19) 
-0.015 
(-.303) 
-0.151 
(-1.43) 
-0.151*** 
(-2.92)  
0.013 
(.655) 
-0.243** 
(-2.39)  
OWNCOLL -.044 
(-.833) 
0.076 
(.734) 
-0.109 
(-1.14) 
-0.171 
(-1.03) 
.020 
(.303)  
-0.019 
(-.393) 
-0.008 
(-.033)  
INTCOLL -.040 
(-1.28) 
0.056 
(1.10) 
-0.034 
(-.712) 
-0.222* 
(-1.92) 
-0.056 
(-1.10) 
-0.011 
(-.537) 
0.203* 
(1.77)  
Constant .022 
(.269) 
0.143 
(1.04)  
0.170 
(1.29) 
-0.365 
(-1.38) 
0.171 
(1.27) 
0.037 
(.728) 
-0.728* 
(-1.84) 
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively 
 
Table 11. Regression coefficients of seemingly unrelated regression models employing ‘short term 
debt’ as the dependent variable. 
 ALL METAL MANU COMPU HOTEL SERVS OTHER 
AGE .008 
(.676) 
-0.005 
(-.167) 
0.050*** 
(2.67) 
0.036 
(.941) 
0.012 
(.471) 
-0.050 
(-1.30) 
0.027 
(.786) 
SIZE .009 
(.590) 
0.052 
(1.61) 
-0.035 
(-1.20) 
-0.016 
(-.443) 
0.012 
(.343) 
0.019 
(.356) 
0.025 
(.526) 
R&D -.011 
(-.464) 
0.067 
(1.06) 
0.108** 
(2.11)  
-0.118** 
(-2.57) 
0.023 
(.341) 
0.059 
(.500) 
0.040 
(.546) 
OWN -.005 
(-.116) 
0.028 
(.314) 
-0.012 
(-.156) 
-0.163 
(-1.63) 
-0.076 
(-.843)  
0.206* 
(1.70) 
0.180* 
(1.97) 
OWNCOLL .129** 
(1.91) 
0.222 
(1.38) 
0.153 
(1.07) 
0.445*** 
(2.84) 
0.056 
(.496)  
-0.314 
(-1.05) 
-0.077 
(-.338)  
INTCOLL .147*** 
(3.64)  
0.200** 
(2.54) 
0.119* 
(1.70) 
0.206* 
(1.88) 
0.264*** 
(3.03)  
0.029 
(.223) 
-0.040 
(-.392)  
Constant .074 
(.692)  
-0.281 
(-1.31) 
-0.147 
(-.758) 
0.401 
(1.60) 
0.021 
(.092)  
0.121 
(.378) 
-0.243 
(-.689)  
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively 
 
 
Table 12. Regression coefficients of seemingly unrelated regression models employing ‘long term 
debt’ as the dependent variable. 
 ALL METAL MANU COMPU HOTEL SERVS OTHER 
AGE -.015* 
(-1.92) 
0.013 
(1.07) 
-0.033** 
(-2.02) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.004 
(-.197) 
-0.017 
(-.808) 
0.005 
(.220) 
SIZE .016* 
(1.65) 
0.004 
(.329) 
0.040 
(1.58) 
0.011 
(.945) 
-0.018 
(-.644) 
-0.014 
(-.488) 
0.008 
(.285) 
R&D -.001 
(-.086) 
-0.004 
(-.151) 
0.001 
(.027) 
-0.019 
(-1.39) 
0.015 
(.269) 
0.122* 
(1.93) 
-0.026 
(-.601)  
OWN -.011 
(-.431) 
-0.028 
(-.821) 
-0.165** 
(-2.52) 
0.010 
(.341) 
0.027 
(.361) 
-0.109 
(-1.66) 
0.057 
(1.05)  
OWNCOLL .014 
(.334) 
-0.022 
(-.361) 
-0.016 
(-.129) 
-0.026 
(-.542) 
0.042 
(.453) 
-0.194 
(-1.19) 
0.194 
(1.44)  
INTCOLL .110*** 
(5.3) 
0.049 
(1.62) 
0.082 
(1.34) 
0.109*** 
(3.29) 
0.106 
(1.48) 
0.202*** 
(2.87) 
0.043 
(.701)  
Constant .033 
(.486) 
-0.040 
(-.493) 
0.178 
(1.05) 
0.104 
(1.38) 
0.098 
(.512) 
0.050 
(.289) 
-0.018 
(-.087) 
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively 
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Table 13. Regression coefficients of seemingly unrelated regression models employing ‘total debt’ as 
the dependent variable.  
 ALL METAL MANU COMPU HOTEL SERVS OTHER 
AGE -.007 
(-.521) 
.007 
(.237) 
.017 
(.716) 
.006 
(.157) 
.008 
(.286) 
-.067* 
(-1.70) 
.032 
(.933)  
SIZE .026 
(1.54) 
.057* 
(1.73) 
.005 
(.141) 
-.006 
(-.172) 
-.006 
(-.169) 
.005 
(.089) 
.033 
(.680) 
R&D -.013 
(-.488) 
.063 
(.994) 
.109* 
(1.69) 
-.137*** 
(-3.24) 
.038 
(.518) 
.181 
(1.51) 
.013 
(.177) 
OWN -.015 
(-.363) 
.000 
(.001) 
-.176* 
(-1.88) 
-.152* 
(-1.65) 
-.049 
(-.505) 
.097 
(.780) 
.238** 
(2.62) 
OWNCOLL .143** 
(1.99) 
.199 
(1.23) 
.137 
(.761) 
.419*** 
(2.90) 
.098 
(.799) 
-.508 
(-1.66) 
.119 
(.527) 
INTCOLL .257*** 
(5.96)  
.248*** 
(3.14) 
.201** 
(2.28) 
.315*** 
(3.11) 
.370*** 
(3.91)  
.230* 
(1.74) 
.000 
(-.004) 
Constant .107 
(.942)  
-.321 
(-1.49) 
.031 
(.128) 
.505** 
(2.18) 
.119 
(.470)  
.171 
(.523)  
-.258 
(-.733) 
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence respectively.  
